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The Written Description Gap
Timothy R. Holbrook*
Within patent law, there are two primary mechanisms that
attempt to afford the appropriate balance between patent
owners and subsequent inventors. First are the disclosure doctrines: a
patent applicant cannot claim more than what she has actually
disclosed in the patent application. A claim that is overly broad
because it lacks adequate support in the patent specification is invalid.
There is a clear link between the extent of the patent
disclosure and the permissible scope of the claims contained therein.
The second constraint on a patentee’s ability to obtain claim
scope is the prior art. A claimed invention must be both novel and nonobvious to be patent eligible. If a patent claim runs into the prior art
because it is anticipated or obvious, then the patent applicant will
have to narrow the scope of the claim to avoid the prior art.
Generally, issues of the sufficiency of the disclosure and validity vis-àvis the prior art are considered in isolation. However, every litigated
patent is also a potential piece of prior art. Because it is the disclosure
of the patent that controls its impact as a piece of prior art, and
not the particular claims in the patent, there is a relationship
between patent disclosure and the prior art doctrines. A patent is good
for what it teaches as a piece of prior art, not for what it claims.
In this regard, the Federal Circuit’s approach to disclosure law, and
the written description requirement in particular, creates the potential
for a “patent free” zone, which I have dubbed the “written description
gap.” As further elaborated below, the Federal Circuit has held that,
if a patent discloses a variant of the invention that would render
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the particular claim obvious, such disclosure nevertheless is
insufficient to satisfy the written description requirement. That
particular applicant would be unable to claim that version of the
invention.
But what happens once the original patent is now used as prior art
against a subsequent applicant? If the later patent claims the obvious
variant, then the subsequent applicant also is unable to obtain patent
coverage. No one will be able to obtain patent protection for that
particular variant, and it effectively falls into the public domain. This
Essay elaborates the operation of this gap and assesses whether it is
normatively good or bad as a matter of patent policy. I ultimately
conclude that, by creating an incentive to enhance patent disclosures,
the gap is good, notwithstanding that some potentially important
variants could fall into the public domain.
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INTRODUCTION
One of the central tensions in patent law relates to patent scope. In
order to offer proper incentives to inventors, a patent must provide
sufficient scope; otherwise, the patent could easily become a “hollow
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and useless thing.”1 If a patent owner is afforded overly broad
protection, however, she could potentially stifle downstream innovators
who may want to build upon and improve her invention.2 These latercomers may be the ones who transform the invention from a nascent
idea into a commercially viable product.
Within patent law, there are two primary mechanisms that attempt to
afford the appropriate balance between patent owners and subsequent
inventors. The disclosure doctrines provide the first mechanism: a
patent applicant cannot claim more than what she has actually disclosed
in the patent application.3 Under section 112(a) of the Patent Act, an
inventor must disclose in the application both a written description of
her invention and how to make and use the invention.4 These disclosure
obligations are known as the written description and enablement
requirements, respectively. The extent of the disclosure limits how
broadly a patent applicant can claim.5 For example, if an applicant has
disclosed a particular vaccine for an RNA virus, she may be entitled to
claim the vaccine for that particular virus but likely cannot claim all
vaccines for RNA viruses (which would include the HIV virus).6 A
1. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950).
2. See, e.g., Timothy R. Holbrook, Equivalency and Patent Law’s Possession Paradox, 23
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 37–46 (2011) (discussing incentives for inventors and subsequent
improvers).
3. See, e.g., Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1353–54 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
(en banc) (“[T]he purpose of the written description requirement is to ensure that the scope of the
right to exclude, as set forth in the claims, does not overreach the scope of the inventor’s
contribution to the field . . . .” (internal quotations omitted)).
4. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012). The patentee is also obligated to disclose the best mode of
practicing the invention, though this obligation is rather toothless because failure to disclose the
best mode is no longer a basis of invalidating a patent claim. See id. § 282(b)(3)(A) (providing
invalidity as a defense “except that the failure to disclose the best mode shall not be a basis on
which any claim of a patent may be canceled or held invalid or otherwise unenforceable”). This
change is found in section 15(a) of the America Invents Act. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act,
Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 15(a), 125 Stat. 284, 328 (2011) (codified in scattered sections of 35
U.S.C.).
5. See Timothy R. Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU L. REV. 123, 157–59 (2006)
(stating that a “patent reward should be commensurate with the scope” of the invention because
“[o]therwise, the patentee would be unduly rewarded for his invention through the granting of
broad patent rights and might preclude others from reaping the benefit of subsequent
innovations”); Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The Formal Structure of Patent Law and the Limits of
Enablement, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1141, 1182 (2008) (“The limits on a patent’s scope
essentially derive from only two sources: the prior art at the time of the invention, and the
inventor’s disclosure.”).
6. See In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1561–64 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (affirming denial of patent
application that included claim for “any and all live, non-pathogenic vaccines, and processes for
making such vaccines, which elicit immunoprotective activity in any animal toward any RNA
virus” where applicant had merely developed a specific avian recombinant virus vaccine).
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claim that is overly broad because it lacks adequate support in the patent
specification is invalid.7 As a result, the scope of the disclosure acts as
a limit on the possible breadth of the claims.
The second constraint on claim scope is the prior art. A claimed
invention must be both novel and non-obvious over the prior art to be
patent eligible.8 The lack of novelty, known as anticipation, arises
when the claimed invention is disclosed in a single prior art reference,
be it a physical act of creation or disclosure in a patent or printed
publication.9 Obviousness requires that the claimed invention be more
than a trivial improvement over the state of the art.10 If a patent claim
during the application process is found invalid as anticipated or obvious,
then the applicant will have to narrow the scope of the claim to avoid

7. See, e.g., Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1358 (invalidating claim under written description
requirement); Auto. Techs. Int’l v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 501 F.3d 1274, 1285 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(invalidating claim under enablement requirement). In theory, the court could use the extent of
the disclosure more robustly to limit claim scope through claim construction. There is a canon of
claim construction that a claim should be construed to maintain its validity if reasonably possible.
See Modine Mfg. Co. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 75 F.3d 1545, 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“When
claims are amenable to more than one construction, they should when reasonably possible be
interpreted so as to preserve their validity.”); Tex. Instruments, Inc. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n,
871 F.2d 1054, 1065 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“Ambiguous claims, whenever possible, should be
construed so as to preserve their validity.”); see also KIMBERLY A. MOORE, TIMOTHY R.
HOLBROOK & JOHN F. MURPHY, PATENT LITIGATION AND STRATEGY 371 (4th. ed. 2013).
Under this canon, if the disclosure fails to support a broader interpretation of a claim, the court
could construe the claim more narrowly to preserve its validity. The Federal Circuit, however,
has suggested that this canon is of little import. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303,
1327–28 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (“While we have acknowledged the maxim that claims should
be construed to preserve their validity, we have not applied that principle broadly, and we have
certainly not endorsed a regime in which validity analysis is a regular component of claim
construction. Instead, we have limited the maxim to cases in which “the court concludes, after
applying all the available tools of claim construction, that the claim is still ambiguous.” (citation
omitted)). But see Timothy R. Holbrook, Patents, Presumptions, and Public Notice, 86 IND. L.J.
779, 803 (2011) [hereinafter Holbrook, Patents, Presumptions] (“[I]nvalidity judgments have a
public-good aspect because third parties can free ride on an invalidity determination by another
without incurring the costs of litigation. Thus, it would seem more appropriate, if we do value
patents, for the courts to err on the side of offering narrower claim constructions that may result
in noninfringement, but nevertheless preserve validity.”); Holbrook, supra note 5, at 157–59
(arguing for more robust use of this canon).
8. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103.
9. Id. § 102; see also K-TEC, Inc. v. Vita-Mix Corp., 696 F.3d 1364, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
(noting, as a matter of law, that it would have been easy to modify a blending container to include
a handle as there are a number of prior art references that disclose blending containers with
handles).
10. Cf. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 14 (1966) (“An invention which has been
made, and which is new in the sense that the same thing has not been made before, may still not
be patentable if the difference between the new thing and what was known before is not
considered sufficiently great to warrant a patent.”).
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the relevant prior art.11
The prior art also acts as a constraint on the permissible scope of a
patent under the doctrine of equivalents. The doctrine of equivalents
allows the patent to cover devices that, while not literally covered by the
claim, are nevertheless considered close enough—equivalent—to the
claimed invention.12 Prior art directly limits the doctrine because
patentees cannot use it to cover subject matter already within the prior
art.13 The prior art indirectly limits the availability of equivalents
through prosecution history estoppel: if a patent applicant narrows the
scope of a claim in response to a rejection, often based on prior art, by
the patent examiner, she may be precluded from arguing the doctrine of
equivalents as to that limitation.14 The prior art, therefore, profoundly
impacts the available scope of a patent.
Generally, courts or the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(“USPTO”) consider the sufficiency of the disclosure and validity vis-àvis the prior art in isolation. The focus of the court or USPTO is
whether the patent at issue satisfies the obligations under section 112(a)
or whether the relevant claims are invalid in light of the prior art. Every
patent, however, is also a potential piece of prior art against a later
11. Cf. In re Youman, 679 F.3d 1335, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (noting that applicants will
“cancel[] or amend[] . . . the original claim in order to overcome prior art”).
12. See Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 21 (1997)
(“Under this doctrine, a product or process that does not literally infringe upon the express terms
of a patent claim may nonetheless be found to infringe if there is ‘equivalence’ between the
elements of the accused product or process and the claimed elements of the patented invention.”).
As the Supreme Court explained:
One who seeks to pirate an invention . . . may be expected to introduce minor
variations to conceal and shelter the piracy. . . . [Limiting the patentee to literal
infringement] would deprive him of the benefit of his invention and would foster
concealment rather than disclosure of inventions . . . .
The doctrine of equivalents evolved in response to this experience.
Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607–08 (1950). Such non-literal
infringement affords the patentee greater protection. See generally Christopher A. Cotropia,
“After-Arising” Technologies and Tailoring Patent Scope, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 151,
157 (2005) (explaining that “the scope of protection afforded to a patent . . . does not stop with
the literal boundaries defined by the claim language”); Holbrook, supra note 2, at 5–6 (explaining
that patent law affords “constructive possession,” providing that “even though the patentee does
not actually ‘possess’ the invention at issue, we consider her to possess the invention for various
policy reasons”).
13. Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assocs., 904 F.2d 677, 683–84 (Fed.
Cir. 1990).
14. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 733-34 (2002)
(“When, however, the patentee originally claimed the subject matter alleged to infringe but then
narrowed the claim in response to a rejection, he may not argue that the surrendered territory
comprised unforeseen subject matter that should be deemed equivalent to the literal claims of the
issued patent.”); Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 30–31.
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patent. Because it is the disclosure of the patent that controls its impact
as a piece of prior art and not the particular claims in the patent, there is
a relationship between patent disclosure and the prior art doctrines. A
patent is good as a piece of prior art for the content of its disclosure and
the expansiveness of what it teaches.15 The scope of the claims is
generally not relevant when the patent is used as prior art. It is error—
one frequently made by my students—to compare the claims of the
prior art patent with the claims of the patent at issue to assess novelty
and non-obviousness. Instead, the proper comparison is between the
disclosure of the prior art patent and the claims of the relevant patent.
In this regard, the Federal Circuit’s approach to disclosure law, and
the written description requirement in particular, creates the potential
for a “patent free” zone, which this Essay dubs the “written description
gap.” As further elaborated below, the Federal Circuit has held that a
disclosure that renders a claim within that patent obvious—but does not
specifically disclose the variant in the claim—is insufficient to satisfy
the written description requirement, and the claim is invalid.16 The
patent applicant would not be able to claim that variant in that
application.17 In litigation, the claim would simply be invalid. That
particular applicant would be unable to claim the obvious variant of the
invention.
Suppose, however, that a subsequent patent applicant wants to now
patent that obvious variant. In other words, what happens once the
original patent is now used as prior art against a subsequent applicant?
Even though the claim was invalidated, this does not undermine the role
of the disclosure in serving as prior art. As a result, if the later patent
claims an obvious variant as well, then the subsequent applicant also is
unable to obtain patent coverage of that version of the invention.
Ultimately, no one will be able to obtain patent protection for that
particular variant, and it will effectively fall into the public domain. Of
course, whether this written description gap is a good or a bad thing is
an entirely different issue.18
15. Cf. Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. LKB Produkter AB, 892 F.2d 1547, 1551 (Fed. Cir.
1989) (“Even if a reference discloses an inoperative device, it is prior art for all that it teaches.”).
16. See infra Part I.B.
17. The patent applicant could file a new application or a continuation-in-part that adds the
variant to the disclosure, but the applicant will forfeit the filing date as to that new matter. See
Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1571–72 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“Entitlement to a
filing date does not extend to subject matter which is not disclosed, but would be obvious over
what is expressly disclosed. It extends only to that which is disclosed.”). If any intervening prior
art arises, the applicant would be unable to patent that variant.
18. See infra Part III.
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This Essay further elaborates on the operation of this gap. Part I
discusses the written description doctrine and the rule that a disclosure
that renders a claim obvious is insufficient to show possession of the
invention. Importantly, this Essay fills a gap in the literature, which up
to this point has failed to address the appropriateness of the “obvious
variant” standard for written description. Part II explains the law of
non-obviousness and elaborates on how any subsequent inventor would
be precluded from claiming that subject matter, creating the gap.
Finally, Part III explores whether such a patent-free zone is normatively
desirable or problematic.
I. THE LAW OF WRITTEN DESCRIPTION AND THE OBVIOUS VARIANT
DOCTRINE
The law of written description has recently—and controversially19—
evolved. This Part briefly explores the evolution of the written
description doctrine, its culmination in the Ariad decision,20 and the
articulation of the “obvious variant” doctrine.21 It concludes with a
critique of the “obvious variant” rule.22
A. The Evolution and Current State of Written Description Law
Although the true origins of the written description requirement are
historically murky,23 the statutory basis for the requirement is found in
section 112(a) of the Patent Act, which requires that a patent application
“contain a written description of the invention.”24 The role of this
provision historically was to prevent the addition of new matter to a
patent application.25 A patent application is generally limited to the
19. See Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly and Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1361–62 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en
banc) (Rader, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (cataloguing judicial critiques);
Holbrook, supra note 5, at 162 nn.218–20 (cataloguing academic critiques).
20. See infra Part I.A.
21. See infra Part I.B.
22. See infra Part I.C.
23. Mark Janis, On Courts Herding Cats: Contending with the “Written Description”
Requirement (and Other Unruly Patent Disclosure Doctrines), 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 55, 63–
64 (2000). The Federal Circuit has traced the origins of a separate written description
requirement to In re Ruschig, 379 F.2d 990 (C.C.P.A. 1967). See Univ. of Rochester v. G.D.
Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916, 922 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[O]ur precedent clearly recognizes a separate
written description requirement [in In Re Ruschig].”).
24. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012). Prior to the adoption of the American Invents Act, this
provision was generally referred to as § 112, ¶ 1. This Essay refers to the current statute.
25. See, e.g., Tronzo v. Biomet, Inc., 156 F.3d 1154, 1158 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“For a claim in a
later-filed application to be entitled to the filing date of an earlier application under 35 U.S.C. §
120 (1994), the earlier application must comply with the written description requirement of 35
U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1 (1994).”); Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
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subject matter disclosed in a non-provisional application, and an
applicant is not permitted to supplement the disclosure with material
discovered after filing.26 If an applicant were able to update the
application, the applicant would be able to cover later-developed
improvements while retaining the earlier filing date.27 The patent
applicant could then avoid having her application compared to postfiling prior art that could invalidate the claims, including the new
material.28 Amended claims in the original application or new claims in
subsequent applications must therefore have support in the specification
of the original application to be entitled to rely upon that earlier filing
date.
If the applicant wishes to add new matter, she can file a continuationin-part application (“CIP”).29 The CIP permits the applicant to continue
to prosecute the application, but she will not be entitled to the filing date
of her earlier application for the new matter. The result of filing a CIP
is that the application has two filing dates: (1) the filing date of the
original application from which the later application claims priority and
(2) the filing date of the CIP for the new matter.30 In litigation,
forfeiture of the earlier filing date can be problematic because there may
be intervening prior art that renders the later-claimed subject matter
invalid as anticipated or obvious.31
The Federal Circuit and one of its predecessor courts, the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals (“CCPA”), evaluated the adequacy of the

(“The cases indicate that the ‘written description’ requirement most often comes into play where
claims not presented in the application when filed are presented thereafter. Alternatively, patent
applicants often seek the benefit of the filing date of an earlier-filed foreign or United States
application . . . .”). See generally JANICE M. MUELLER, PATENT LAW 144–46 (4th ed. 2013).
26. 35 U.S.C. § 132(a) (“No amendment shall introduce new matter into the disclosure of the
invention.”).
27. MUELLER, supra note 25, at 145 (“Without written description of the invention scrutiny, a
later-presented or amended claim not truly entitled to the earlier filing date of the application
would be improperly examined against a smaller universe of prior art than is legally available.”).
28. Id.
29. See Hal Mitton & James P. Bonnamy, CIP Practice Under and Beyond the Proposed Rule
Changes for Continuations, 88 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 801, 803 (2006) (explaining
the process of filing a “continuing” patent application). The various forms of continuing
applications are authorized under 35 U.S.C. § 120. See generally Mark A. Lemley & Kimberly
A. Moore, Ending the Abuse of Continuing Applications, 84 B.U. L. REV. 63, 68 (2004)
(explaining that a continuation application can be filed at any time before the PTO issues the
patent or prior to the applicant abandoning the application. Applications can be filed after a
rejection or after an allowance). The USPTO has implemented CIP applications in 37 C.F.R. §
1.53(d)(2).
30. Mitton & Bonnamy, supra note 29, at 803.
31. See, e.g., Tronzo v. Biomet, Inc., 156 F.3d 1154, 1158 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
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disclosure under a “possession” test: a patent could claim priority if the
earlier application demonstrated that the inventor was in possession of
the subject matter in the later application.32 In this context, a court
compares what was claimed in the later application to the disclosure of
the patent from which priority was sought.33 If there is an antecedent
basis for the subject matter, the claim is entitled to the earlier filing
date.34 The particular subject matter does not have to be identically
disclosed to establish adequate support.35 For originally filed claims,
however, there would not be a new matter problem. Because claims are
part of the specification,36 the subject matter claimed was necessarily in
the original patent document and not new matter by definition.37
Over time, the Federal Circuit began to expand the role of the written
description doctrine beyond policing new matter. Initially starting with
biotechnology-related inventions38 and later expanding into other
fields,39 the Federal Circuit began to apply written description doctrine
as a tool for combating claim scope, regardless of whether new matter

32. Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563–64 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“[T]he applicant
must also convey with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that, as of the filing date
sought, he or she was in possession of the invention.” (emphasis omitted)); In re Kaslow, 707
F.2d 1366, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1983); In re Herschler, 591 F.2d 693, 700 (C.C.P.A. 1979); see also
Moba, B.V. v. Diamond Automation, Inc., 325 F.3d 1306, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“The test for
compliance with § 112 has always required sufficient information in the original disclosure to
show that the inventor possessed the invention at the time of the original filing.”).
33. See, e.g., Tronzo, 156 F.3d at 1158 (explaining that “the disclosure of the earlier
application, the parent, must reasonably convey to one of skill in the art that the inventor
possessed the later-claimed subject matter at the time the parent application was filed”).
34. Vas-Cath, 935 F.2d at 1558–60.
35. Kaslow, 707 F.2d at 1375 (“The test for determining compliance with the written
description requirement is whether the disclosure of the application as originally filed reasonably
conveys to the artisan that the inventor had possession at that time of the later claimed subject
matter, rather than the presence or absence of literal support in the specification for the claim
language.” (quoting the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences)).
36. 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) (2012) (“The specification shall conclude with one or more
claims . . . .”); see also Markman v. Westview Instruments, 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en
banc) (“Claims must be read in view of the specification, of which they are a part.”), aff’d, 517
U.S. 368 (1996).
37. Janice M. Mueller, The Evolving Application of the Written Description Requirement to
Biotechnological Inventions, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 615, 633–34 (1998).
38. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly, 119 F.3d 1559, 1568–69 (Fed. Cir.
1997). See generally Mueller, supra note 37, at 633–52 (discussing in depth the written
description requirements as applied to biotechnological subject matter).
39. See, e.g., LizardTech, Inc. v. Earth Res. Mapping, Inc., 424 F.3d 1336, 1344–47 (Fed. Cir.
2005) (applying written description requirement of 35 U.S.C. §112 to software-related invention);
Moba, B.V. v. Diamond Automation, Inc., 325 F.3d 1306, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (applying the
written description requirement to method of processing eggs).
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was introduced into the patent.40 This new doctrine applied to
originally filed claims as well as later-submitted or amended claims.41
The en banc Federal Circuit resolved the controversy and uncertainty
surrounding this doctrine in Ariad Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eli Lilly and
Co.42 The technology at issue involved methods for regulating gene
expression in order to reduce harmful symptoms of various diseases.43
The claims were broad genus claims, covering the use of all substances
that “achieved the desired result of reducing the binding” of the relevant
protein to particular sites.44 The claims actually contained a single step:
reducing the activity of the relevant protein.45 Unfortunately for Ariad,
the specification only hypothesized how that step was to be performed.
Specifically, it only offered three hypothetical classes of compounds
that inhibit gene expression, but nothing in the specification suggested
that the inventor identified any particular molecules that actually
worked.46 The court concluded that this thin disclosure failed the
written description requirement and invalidated the claims.47
The en banc court explained the rationale for the written description
requirement: the doctrine helps to combat “genus claims that use
functional language to define the boundaries of a claimed genus.”48
These broad claims may “simply claim a desired result, and may do so
without describing species that achieve that result,”49 which would
disrupt the appropriate quid pro quo between inventors and the public.50
B. Obvious Variants are Not Considered within the Possession of the
Inventor
Ariad confirmed that the written description requirement can be used
to invalidate overly broad claims regardless of concerns of priority.
Determining what disclosure is sufficient to satisfy the written
40. Moba, 325 F.3d at 1319–20 (discussing two variants of written description law). See
generally Holbrook, Patents, Presumptions, supra note 7, at 794–95 (discussing the expansion of
the doctrine). There is a rich literature discussing the written description requirement’s evolution.
See id. at 792–93 n.86.
41. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 119 F.3d at 1568–69 (applying doctrine to originally filed
claims).
42. 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc).
43. Id. at 1340.
44. Id. at 1341.
45. Id. at 1354.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 1357–58.
48. Id. at 1349.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1345.

HOLBROOK.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

12/6/2013 12:48 PM

The Written Description Gap

355

description requirement, however, is a different challenge. Even the
court in Ariad candidly admitted that “[t]he term ‘possession[]’ . . . has
never been very enlightening” when assessing the written description
requirement.51
The court thereafter offered a few “broad principles” to help guide a
fact finder in assessing the sufficiency of a patent disclosure.52
Drawing upon the priority cases, the court noted that
the written description requirement does not demand either examples
or an actual reduction to practice;53 a constructive reduction to
practice that in a definite way identifies the claimed invention can
satisfy the written description requirement.54 Conversely, we have
repeatedly stated that actual “possession” or reduction to practice
outside of the specification is not enough. Rather, as stated above, it
is the specification itself that must demonstrate possession.55

Importantly for this Essay, the court also addressed the specificity
with which a particular embodiment must be disclosed for adequate
support to exist. The court noted that, to satisfy the written description
requirement, the specification does not have to “recite the claimed
invention in haec verba.”56 Nevertheless, the court made clear that “a
description that merely renders the invention obvious does not satisfy
the requirement.”57
This exclusion of obvious variants has its genesis in slightly older
Federal Circuit cases, although the rule is not a venerable one of
considerable age. While recent panels have recited the rule, both before
and after Ariad,58 the origin of the rule traces back to Lockwood v.
51. Id. at 1351.
52. Id. at 1352.
53. Id.; Fox Grp., Inc. v. Cree, Inc., 700 F.3d 1300, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2012). “Reduction to
practice” is a term of art in patent law, where the inventor has created a physical embodiment of
the invention that works for its intended purpose. Fox Grp., Inc., 700 F.3d at 1305.
54. Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1352; see also Solvay S.A. v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 622 F.3d 1367,
1376 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (further discussing actual reduction versus constructive reduction practice).
A constructive reduction to practice occurs when an applicant files an application that satisfies the
disclosure requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112(a), which include providing an adequate written
description and an enabling disclosure. Thus, an inventor can file an application even if she has
not physically constructed a working embodiment (i.e., actually reduced the invention to
practice).
55. Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1352 (citations omitted).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. See, e.g., Research Corp. Techs. Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859, 870 (Fed. Cir.
2010) (“Entitlement to a filing date extends only to subject matter that is disclosed; not to that
which is obvious.” (internal citations omitted)); In re Meyer Mfg. Corp., 411 Fed. Appx. 316, 319
(Fed. Cir. 2010) (describing the difference between the obviousness principle and the written
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American Airlines, Inc.59 The court in Lockwood confronted a
traditional priority issue where the patent holder claimed priority to an
earlier application.60 In the case, there were a series of applications
prior to the one that eventually issued as the patent at issue.61 The law
is clear that, “[i]n order to gain the benefit of the filing date of an earlier
application, . . . each application in the chain leading back to the earlier
application must comply with the written description requirement.”62
The patent holder suggested that an earlier application would render the
claimed invention obvious, entitling the patent holder to rely on the
earlier filing date to avoid intervening prior art.63 The Federal Circuit
rejected this argument:
Entitlement to a filing date does not extend to subject matter which is
not disclosed, but would be obvious over what is expressly disclosed.
It extends only to that which is disclosed. While the meaning of
terms, phrases, or diagrams in a disclosure is to be explained or
interpreted from the vantage point of one skilled in the art, all the
limitations must appear in the specification. The question is not
whether a claimed invention is an obvious variant of that which is
disclosed in the specification. Rather, a prior application itself must
describe an invention, and do so in sufficient detail that one skilled in
the art can clearly conclude that the inventor invented the claimed
invention as of the filing date sought.64

The court reasoned further that “[o]ne shows that one is ‘in
possession’ of the invention by describing the invention, with all its
claimed limitations, not that which makes it obvious.”65 Other cases
description principle); PowerOasis, Inc. v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 522 F.3d 1299, 1306 (Fed. Cir.
2008) (requiring that the written description actually or inherently disclose the claim element);
Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 119 F.3d at 1567 (explaining that a specification which only
provides a general method of producing human insulin cDNA and a description of the human
insulin A and B chain amino acid sequences which it encodes does not provide a proper written
description of that human insulin cDNA).
59. 107 F.3d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
60. Id. at 1571.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1571–72.
65. Id. at 1572 (emphasis omitted). The court has also taken pains to distinguish enablement
from written description by noting that “[i]t is ‘not a question of whether one skilled in the art
might be able to construct the patentee’s device from the teachings of the disclosure . . . . Rather,
it is a question whether the application necessarily discloses that particular device.’” Martin v.
Mayer, 823 F.2d 500, 505 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (quoting Jepson v. Coleman, 314 F.2d 533, 536
(C.C.P.A. 1963) (emphasis omitted)); see also Hyatt v. Boone, 146 F.3d 1348, 1353–54 (Fed. Cir.
1998) (same). But see Brief for Mark D. Janis & Timothy R. Holbrook as Amici Curiae In
Support of Neither Party at 6–13, Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir.
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have subsequently embraced this approach to assessing whether a claim
satisfies the written description requirement.66
Nevertheless, this “obvious variant” rule creates an odd wrinkle for
patent applicants—one that is often overlooked. An applicant need not
identically describe a particular embodiment to satisfy the written
description requirement; disclosure of an equivalent is sufficient.67 But
a description that renders a variant obvious—likely because an aspect of
the claimed invention has not been expressly disclosed—is not enough
to show possession. For example, a disclosure that describes a screw
likely provides sufficient support for a claim including a limitation for a
nail. But a disclosure that omits any discussion of the screw, even if the
person having ordinary skill in the art (“PHOSITA”) would view the
use of a screw or nail as obvious, would not be sufficient. What would
constitute equivalent and sufficient versus obvious and insufficient is a
difficult line to draw, if there even is a difference.68
C. Critique of the Obvious Variant Rule—if Obvious, Why Not “In
Possession?”
Interestingly, the obvious variant rule has received virtually no
scholarly attention or criticism. This dearth of discussion is particularly
surprising given the amount of attention the written description
requirement has received generally.69 It is even more surprising when
2010) (en banc) (No. 2008-1248), 2009 WL 3657814 (arguing that enablement can police both
scope and priority).
66. See, e.g., PowerOasis, Inc. v. T-Mobile, Inc., 522 F.3d 1299, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2008); In re
Huston, 308 F.3d 1267, 1277 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Tronzo v. Biomet, Inc., 156 F.3d 1154, 1158 (Fed.
Cir. 1998).
67. Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“Although the
exact terms need not be used in haec verba, the specification must contain an equivalent
description of the claimed subject matter.” (internal citation omitted)).
68. Assuming the court intended “equivalent” to draw upon ideas underlying the doctrine of
equivalents, both the Federal Circuit and commentators have suggested that obviousness and
equivalency are essentially the same. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki
Co., 493 F.3d 1368, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“But there is a strong argument that an equivalent
cannot be both non-obvious and insubstantial.”); Roton Barrier, Inc. v. Stanley Works, 79 F.3d
1112, 1128 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (Nies, J., additional views) (“A substitution in a patented invention
cannot be both nonobvious and insubstantial.”); Alan L. Durham, Patent Symmetry, 87 B.U. L.
REV. 969, 993–94 (2007) (noting similarity between obviousness and equivalency). But see Atlas
Powder Co. v. E.I. du Pont De Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (rejecting
rule that separate patent precludes finding of equivalency).
69. See, e.g., Holbrook, Patents, Presumptions, supra note 7, at 795; Janis, supra note 23;
Duane M. Linstrom, Spontaneous Mutation: A Sudden Change in the Evolution of the Written
Description Requirement as It Applies to Genetic Patents, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 947, 970
(2003); Janice M. Mueller, The Evolving Application of the Written Description Requirement to
Biotechnological Inventions, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 615, 615–51 (1998); Harold C. Wegner,
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one reviews the Lockwood decision, because it offers no justification for
the rule. In short, why isn’t an obvious variant viewed as showing that
the inventor was in possession of the claimed invention? This Section
discusses the advantages and disadvantages of the obvious variant rule.
1. Arguments Against the Obvious Variant Rule
The efficacy of this rule is questionable because the patent system
does not permit an applicant to obtain a patent on obvious variations in
the state of the art.70 In some sense, therefore, an obvious invention is
already within the grasp of the PHOSITA.71 An obvious variant,
therefore, is within the possession of the public. From a validity
perspective, therefore, it seems theoretically inconsistent to treat an
invention as being within the possession of the inventor for purposes of
the obviousness doctrine but not within the possession of the applicant
for purposes of written description doctrine.
Patent law has used obviousness to measure possession in other
contexts as well. Under the 1952 Patent Act, an applicant can
demonstrate an earlier invention date by showing she had created a
version of the invention that would render any subsequent piece of prior
art obvious. In this context, the applicant is able to antedate a potential
prior art reference by showing she came up with her invention before
the reference. Specifically, in In re Stryker, the CCPA held that if the
inventor can demonstrate that she invented something that would render
the claim obvious, the applicant could antedate the reference.72 The
applicant had proven he had reduced a variant of the invention to
practice prior to the date of an issued patent, but what the applicant had
created did not contain all of the limitations in his actual claim.73
Nevertheless, the court concluded that because what he had reduced to
practice would render the prior art patent obvious, the applicant had
effectively antedated the reference and removed it as a piece of prior

When a Written Description Is Not a “Written Description”: When Enzo Says It’s Not, 12 FED.
CIR. B.J. 271, 274 (2002).
70. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012) (“A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained . . . if
the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention
as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a
person having ordinary skill in the art . . . .”).
71. See Holbrook, supra note 5, at 169–73 (discussing relationship between enablement,
obviousness, and possession); Timothy R. Holbrook, A Possession-Based Approach to Patent
Validity (2013) (unpublished manuscript) (draft on file with author) (offering a possession-based
theory of obviousness).
72. In re Stryker, 435 F.2d 1340, 1341–42 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
73. Id. at 1341.
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art.74 In this context, therefore, the court used obviousness to
demonstrate that the inventor was sufficiently in possession of the
invention to justify antedating the reference.75
The written description doctrine could operate very similarly in these
circumstances. If the variant is obvious in light of the disclosure, it is
highly likely that the specification would enable one of ordinary skill in
the art to make it. If one of skill in the art could actually make and use
the device, then one would think that the inventor had demonstrated
sufficiently that she was in possession of the claimed invention.76
2. Arguments in Favor of the Obvious Variant Rule
There are other patent law doctrines, however, that could support the
obvious variant rule by analogy. In these circumstances, the law treats
obvious variants as beyond the reach of an applicant. The issue of a
sufficient disclosure is similar to that of the public dedication rule. The
public dedication rule effectively precludes a patent owner from
covering any embodiment of the invention that she disclosed in the
application but failed to claim.77 In particular, the patentee cannot use
the doctrine of equivalents to cover disclosed but unclaimed
embodiments of the invention.78 This doctrine necessarily raised the
issue of what disclosure is sufficient to trigger the public dedication
rule.79 Relevant to the written description gap, the question is whether
the public dedication rule would be triggered if the specification did not
disclose the precise device accused of infringement but instead only
rendered it obvious.
Although the Federal Circuit has not squarely addressed the issue, the
likely answer is that obvious variants are not considered to be dedicated

74. Id. at 1341–42.
75. See also In re Spiller, 500 F.2d 1170, 1177 (C.C.P.A. 1974) (“The question, then, is
whether the rule of Stryker ought to be extended to a situation where the [showing of prior
invention] is not fully commensurate with the reference but renders the claimed invention
obvious. We think Stryker is controlling in this situation as well . . . .”).
76. See Holbrook, supra note 5, at 161–63 (arguing that enablement, not written description,
is the best way to demonstrate possession).
77. See Johnson & Johnston Assocs. Inc. v. R.E. Serv. Co., Inc., 285 F.3d 1046, 1054 (Fed.
Cir. 2002) (en banc) (“Application of the doctrine of equivalents to recapture subject matter
deliberately left unclaimed would ‘conflict with the primacy of the claims in defining the scope of
the patentee’s exclusive right.’” (quoting Sage Prods. Inc. v. Devon Indus., Inc., 126 F.3d 1420,
1424 (Fed. Cir. 1997))).
78. Id.
79. See Mark D. Janis & Timothy R. Holbrook, Patent Law’s Audience, 97 MINN. L. REV. 72,
107–11 (2011) (discussing the disclosure-dedication rule and other specification-based doctrines
of surrender).
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to the public. If the specific embodiment is not actually disclosed, then
the rationale underlying the rule—that the inventor should have claimed
the variant80—is greatly undermined. The courts only view the subject
matter disclaimed if it is expressly listed in the patent document. 81 It
would be a harsh rule indeed if the patentee were deemed to have
dedicated not only disclosed embodiments but also all obvious
embodiments if they were not expressly claimed. Such a rule could
severely curtail the availability of the doctrine of equivalents.
Another area in which patent law, at present, does not treat
possession and obviousness interchangeably is under the new firstinventor-to-file regime provided by the America Invents Act (“AIA”).
Under the AIA, prior art is defined relative to the filing date: if the
invention is described in a patent or printed publication, or is offered for
sale or used publicly before the application date, then it is invalid.82
One exception to this rule, however, is when the applicant can show that
she disclosed the subject matter claimed in the patent prior to such acts,
or when a third party who derived the subject matter from her disclosed
the subject matter before those acts.83
The question that arose is if that earlier disclosure with its origins
from the applicant does not identically disclose the subject matter but
instead renders it obvious, would that be sufficient to remove the piece
of prior art, in a manner akin to Stryker? As a preliminary matter, the
USPTO suggested in its preliminary guidelines implementing the AIA
that such disclosures would not exclude the prior art: only a disclosure
of the identical subject matter can be used to antedate a prior art
reference.84 The preliminary guidelines noted that
[e]ven if the only differences between the subject matter in the prior
art disclosure that is relied upon under 35 U.S.C. 102(a) and the
subject matter publicly disclosed by the inventor before such prior art
disclosure are mere insubstantial changes, or only trivial or obvious

80. Holbrook, supra note 2, at 22.
81. See, e.g., Toro Co. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 383 F.3d 1326, 1333–34 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(discussing sufficiency of disclosure to trigger public dedication rule); PSC Computer Prods., Inc.
v. Foxconn Int’l, 355 F.3d 1353, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (same).
82. Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 3, 125 Stat. 284, 285–86 (2011) (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1)).
83. Id. at 286 (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)(1)(B)). For examples of how the AIA prior art
provisions work, see MOORE, HOLBROOK & MURPHY, supra note 7, at 691–98.
84. Examination Guidelines for Implementing the First-Inventor-to-File Provisions of the
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 43,759, 43,767 (July 26, 2012) (to be codified at
37 C.F.R. pt. 1).
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variations, the exception under 35 U.S.C. 102(b)(1)(B) does not
apply.85

In this context, an obvious variant—like the written description rule—is
not considered as demonstrating possession by the applicant. The
USPTO promulgated final rules guidelines seem to step back slightly
from this strict rule. There is no longer a reference to “obvious
variations,” though the USPTO insists that the earlier disclosure must
still be identical.86 In any event, the USPTO lacks substantive rulemaking authority, and therefore, it remains to be seen whether the courts
agree with this approach to the new section 102.87
Aside from these comparisons, a number of policies arguably support
the exclusion of obvious variants from the scope of a patent’s written
description. The Federal Circuit has emphasized, both in the written
description context and others, the primacy of the patent disclosure.88
For example, the court in Ariad emphasized that possession can only be
demonstrated by the patent document.89 Evidence that the applicant had
actually reduced the invention to practice in a lab is irrelevant to the
written description analysis unless the reduction to practice is
memorialized in the patent document itself.90 The court therefore hoped
to channel more information into the patent document to aid in public
notice and fulfilling the disclosure function of the patent system.
The exclusion of obvious variants from the written description rule
complements these public notice and disclosure functions. If the patent
applicant wants to claim certain variations of the invention, then she
85. Id. (emphasis added).
86. Examination Guidelines for Implementing the First Inventor To File Provisions of the
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,059, 11,061, 11,065–68, (Feb. 14, 2013) (to
be codified at C.F.R. pt. 1). The USPTO still requires identical subject matter but permits that the
earlier disclosure need not be “a verbatim or ipsissimis verbis disclosure.” Id. at 11,077.
87. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303,
1344 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Moore, J., concurring) (discussing the patentability of DNA from the
human body), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad
Genetics, Inc., 133 S.Ct. 2107 (2013); David Orozco, Administrative Patent Levers, 117 PENN.
ST. L. REV. 1, 7 (2012) (stating that “the PTO, unlike most administrative agencies, lacks
substantive rule-making authority, and its foray into substantive rulemaking will likely be
reviewed by the federal courts”).
88. See Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc)
(noting sufficiency of written description is satisfied by the four corners of the patent alone and
not extrinsic evidence); Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc)
(emphasizing intrinsic evidence in claim construction); see also Holbrook, Patents,
Presumptions, supra note 7, at 808–25 (advocating use of presumptions to emphasize importance
of intrinsic evidence while balancing views of the PHOSITA).
89. Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1351.
90. Id. at 1351–54.
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needs to disclose them expressly (or equivalently) in the patent
specification.
Permitting a patent applicant to claim obvious variants necessarily
would involve consideration of information outside of the patent
document itself. In the validity context, the obviousness inquiry is
highly fact-intensive, involving consideration of a variety of factors,
such as the knowledge of the PHOSITA and the scope and content of
the prior art.91 To properly analyze whether the variant is obvious in
light of the specification, therefore, would require the court to venture
outside of the four corners of the patent document itself, comparing the
state of the art to the disclosure to divine what the PHOSITA would
know. The court, by adopting the obvious variant rule, in essence has
concluded that the loss of certainty and the added cost of performing
such an investigation are simply not worth the effort when the patentee
could have simply disclosed the variant. In other words, the applicant
should be overly inclusive in what she chooses to disclose in the initial
application. The patent drafter is the lowest cost avoider in this
situation.
D. Evaluation of the Exclusion of Obvious Variants from Satisfying the
Written Description Requirement
The Federal Circuit adopted the rule that a specification that renders a
particular embodiment obvious does not satisfy the written description
requirement, and did so with little explanation or consideration of the
benefits and disadvantages of such a rule. The rule is arguably
inconsistent with a possession-based view of the patent disclosure. It
does, however, serve the laudable interest in incentivizing more robust
and timely disclosures in the initial application. Although I disagree
with this rule, particularly on theoretical grounds, I will take the rule as
a given for the remainder of this Essay.
II. THE INTERSECTION OF WRITTEN DESCRIPTION LAW AND
OBVIOUSNESS—THE WRITTEN DESCRIPTION GAP
When discussing the written description doctrine, courts necessarily
are concerned with the issue before it—whether the relevant claims are
adequately supported by the specification. What courts do not (and
should not) take into account is the possible future use of that patent
(now with invalid claims) as a piece of prior art to be used against
future patent applicants.
91. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966).
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Issued patents qualify as prior art under sections 102(a), (b), and (e)
of the 1952 Patent Act92 and under § 102(a) of the AIA.93 Moreover,
because issued patents are published, they would also qualify as a
printed publication.94 Invalid claims in a patent application have no
impact on the application’s status as prior art because it is the patent
disclosure that is relevant, not the claims. Prior art can be nearly
anything,95 so long as it was publicly accessible before the relevant
date.96 The standard is therefore capacious.
Because invalidating a patent claim does not eliminate a patent as a
form of prior art, any issued patent, even one that contains a claim that
is invalid for lack of adequate support in the specification, can also be a
form of prior art. It could be used to invalidate a later patent claim as
lacking novelty97 or being obvious.98 It is this latter use that creates the
odd wrinkle in the relationship between the written description law and
obviousness.
A patent claim is invalid if it would be obvious to one of skill in the
art.99 In order to assess obviousness, a court considers the scope and
92. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(a), (b), (e) (2012).
93. Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 3, 125 Stat. 284, 285–86 (2011) (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)).
94. See id. (AIA); 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(a), (b) (1952 Patent Act).
95. In re Epstein, 32 F.3d 1559, 1562–63, 1567–68 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (using a database product
brochure and seminar book as prior art); MPEP § 901.06 (8th ed. Aug. 2001), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/old/E8R0_900.pdf (“All printed publications may be
used as references . . . .”).
96. In re Lister, 583 F.3d 1307, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (concluding that manuscript became
“accessible” when it was included in searchable online databases, which occurred after the critical
date); Bruckelmyer v. Ground Heaters, Inc., 445 F.3d 1374, 1378–79 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (finding
that a diagram in a Canadian patent application, but not in the issued patent, was sufficiently
publicly accessible to constitute printed publication); In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d 1345, 1350–51
(Fed. Cir. 2004) (determining that a slide presentation constituted a printed publication because it
was sufficiently publicly accessible). See generally Sean B. Seymore, The “Printed Publication”
Bar after Klopfenstein: Has the Federal Circuit Changed the Way Professors Should Talk About
Science?, 40 AKRON L. REV. 493, 494–95 (2007) (explaining how the Klopfenstein decision will
affect science professors discussing their research).
97. § 3, 125 Stat. at 285–87 (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 102) (AIA); 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1952 Patent
Act).
98. 35 U.S.C. § 103.
99. The timing element of the obviousness inquiry—i.e., at what time do we assess whether a
claim is obvious—has shifted under the America Invents Act. Under the 1952 Patent Act, the
statute required that obviousness be assessed “at the time the invention was made.” Id. § 103(a).
Judicial gloss made it clear, however, that obviousness was truly made as of the critical date—
i.e., the date one year prior to the application’s filing date. See In re Foster, 343 F.2d 980, 990
(C.C.P.A. 1965); see also Timothy R. Holbrook, The More Things Change, the More They Stay
the Same: Implications of Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc. and the Quest for Predictability in the
On-Sale Bar, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 933, 962–66, 984–91 (exploring use of on-sale bar for
obviousness purposes and rejecting the “ready for patenting” test in the obviousness context).
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content of the prior art, the differences between the prior art and the
claimed invention, the level of ordinary skill in the art, and any other
relevant secondary considerations, such as the commercial success of
the invention, the failure of others, and long-felt but unsolved needs in
the market.100 The obviousness requirement, codifying earlier Supreme
Court precedent,101 precludes an inventor from patenting something
that, while technically new, is merely a trivial improvement on the state
of the art.102
The obviousness inquiry therefore has significant implications for the
written description doctrine. If a claim is held to fail the written
description requirement because it merely claims something obvious in
light of the specification, the patentee is precluded from claiming that
embodiment. When that patent, however, is then used as prior art
against a subsequent application that is also claiming that variant, then
necessarily it would be obvious as well. The improvement would
merely be a trivial advancement in the state of the art.
The consequence of this dynamic is that the “obvious variant” rule
creates a gap in patent protection. The original applicant is unable to
claim the variant because she did not provide adequate support in the
specification. If obvious variants were viewed as falling within the
possession of the original inventor, she would be able to claim patent
protection for it. But, under the current rule, she cannot, absent
potentially filing a CIP at the cost of the earlier filing date. Subsequent
innovators, however, cannot claim the variant either because the
original application renders that variant obvious as well. Neither the
original inventor nor subsequent applicants can claim that variation.
Under the AIA, the timing for the obviousness inquiry is “before the effective filing date of the
claimed invention.” § 3, 125 Stat. at 287–88 (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 103).
100. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18; see also Transocean Offshore Deepwater
Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Drilling USA, Inc., 699 F.3d 1340, 1349–55 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (finding
presumption of obviousness rebutted by secondary considerations).
101. See Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. 248, 267 (1850) (“[F]or unless more ingenuity and
skill in applying the old method of fastening the shank and the knob were required in the
application of it to the clay or porcelain knob than were possessed by an ordinary mechanic
acquainted with the business, there was an absence of that degree of skill and ingenuity which
constitute essential elements of every invention.”); see also Graham, 383 U.S. at 3–4 (noting that
§ 103 is a codification of Hotchkiss).
102. See Christopher A. Cotropia, Nonobviousness and the Federal Circuit: An Empirical
Analysis of Recent Case Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 911, 915–16 (2007) (stating the process
for determining nonobviousness); Christopher A. Cotropia, Patent Law Viewed Through an
Evidentiary Lens: The “Suggestion Test” as a Rule of Evidence, 2006 BYU L. REV. 1517, 1524–
25 (arguing that “[t]he nonobviousness doctrine . . . [ensures] that patent protection is not given to
inventions in those instances where others would have developed the idea even without the
incentive of a patent” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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Necessarily, it falls into the gap and enters into the public domain. This
gap is what this Essay refers to as the written description gap, and it is
graphically demonstrated below:

This gap in protection could be viewed as comparable to a
similar gap in protection created by the utility doctrine as it relates to
chemical compounds.103 If a scientist discovers how to make a new
compound, but does not know of the compound’s utility, she cannot
obtain protection on it because an invention must have utility to be
patentable.104 Moreover, if that discovery—of how to make the new
compound—constitutes a form of prior art (for example, if the original
inventor used it in public or disclosed the method of making the
compound in a printed publication), then no one can obtain protection
over the compound.105 The Supreme Court has expanded that rule even
more, holding that the method of making a chemical with no known use

103. For a critique of current utility law, see Sean B. Seymore, Making Patents Useful, 98
MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=2228956.
104. 35 U.S.C. § 101; see also In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1369–72 (2005) (discussing
requirements for demonstrating utility); Timothy R. Holbrook, The Expressive Impact of Patents,
84 WASH. U. L. REV. 573, 600–09, 618–21 (2006) (discussing and criticizing the normative aspect
of the utility doctrine).
105. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 528–29 (1966); see Sean B. Seymore, Rethinking
Novelty in Patent Law, 60 DUKE L.J. 919, 933 & n.62 (2011) (explaining that enablement for
anticipation purposes only requires the prior art to teach how to make, not how to use).
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is also unpatentable for lack of utility.106 Subsequent innovators who
discover uses for the compound, however, cannot patent the compound
itself. Because the prior art taught how to make the compound, any
claim to the compound is anticipated by the prior art. As a result,
claims to chemical compounds can fall through the cracks and be
ineligible for patent protection.
Of course, subsequent innovators can patent methods of making or
using known compounds, assuming these inventions are novel and
nonobvious. And utility rarely has much impact in areas other than
chemistry and biotechnology.
In contrast, written description and the obvious variant rule could
apply in more technological areas. Moreover, the obviousness rule
tends to be more robust than utility, which means potentially more
subject matter could fall into the public domain.
The written description gap is similar to the dynamic between
obviousness and the now relatively moribund best mode requirement,
discussed by professors Lee Petherbridge and Jason Rantanen.107 Prior
to the evisceration of the best mode requirement by the AIA, 108
Petherbridge and Rantanen suggested that the interaction between the
best mode and obviousness would create spaces of public domain
information that “limit the patentability of modest incremental
improvements, the patenting of which may adversely impact the
incentive structure imposed by the patent laws. The best mode
requirement, in other words, cooperates with nonobviousness doctrine
to protect the public domain.”109 In their analysis, the disclosure of a
best mode reduces the possibility of a patent on any improvement:
“Because of the way that the best mode requirement cooperates with the
nonobviousness doctrine, embodiments similar or predictable in view of
what the best mode disclosure adds to the prior art are also barred from
future patenting.”110 The authors, therefore, bemoaned the loss of best
mode because the failure to make these disclosures will allow greater
downstream patenting and reduce the public domain.111
The written description gap here works somewhat differently: the
106. Brenner, 383 U.S. at 530–36.
107. Lee Petherbridge & Jason Rantanen, In Memoriam Best Mode, 64 STAN. L.
REV. ONLINE 125 (2012), available at http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/sites/default/files/on
line/articles/64-SLRO-125.pdf.
108. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2006).
109. Petherbridge & Rantanen, supra note 107, at 128.
110. Id. at 129.
111. Id. at 129–30.
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public domain is enhanced when the patent disclosure renders the
claimed variant obvious, invalidating the claim.
In contrast,
Petherbridge’s and Rantanen’s approach depends on the patent
applicant making a sufficient disclosure of the best mode. Nevertheless,
the relationship between the disclosure and the obviousness doctrine
creates a gap through which the obvious variant falls into the public
domain.
III. IS THE WRITTEN DESCRIPTION GAP NORMATIVELY GOOD OR BAD?
The existence of the gap does not answer the question of whether the
gap is normatively desirable in patent law. Perhaps, as suggested by
Petherbridge and Rantanen, practitioners like the gap. The gap allows
certain information to be forced into the public domain. Others are
immediately free to rely upon and use that information as it is free from
patent protection.112 Additionally, there is an easy way to avoid the
gap: the patent applicant could merely include the obvious variant in the
initial disclosure. As between the applicant and the public, we favor the
public because the applicant is the lowest cost avoider. The gap reduces
the incentive for an applicant to attempt to game the system by holding
back obvious variants or, worse, trying to capture later-developed-yetobvious variants within the literal scope of the patent. The harsh
penalty of the gap will incentivize disclosure. Consequently, from an
access and incentive viewpoint, the gap might be desirable.
But the gap could create problems. In a manner similar to the utilitychemical compound dynamic, certain embodiments that fall into the gap
might be those that are the most valuable. Although anyone is free to
use the obvious variant, the lack of a patent may create a barrier to
anyone actually commercializing and bringing the invention to market.
If a firm cannot exclude others from making that embodiment, then it
may not find it cost effective to commercialize it, even if it is superior.
Additionally, the written description gap is in tension with the idea of
obviousness demonstrating possession: arguably the PHOSITA would
see the original patent applicant as having the variant within her
possession given that it is a trivial improvement. Nevertheless,
112. This assumes that the patent owner is unable to cover the obvious variant under the
doctrine of equivalents somehow. Given that the patent owner attempted to claim the variant
literally, but that claim is invalid, then it would seem that access to the doctrine of equivalents
would be precluded. But see Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 609
(1950) (allowing use of doctrine of equivalents to cover embodiment covered in invalidated
claim); Johnson & Johnston Assocs. Inc. v. R.E. Serv. Co., Inc., 285 F.3d 1046, 1053 (Fed. Cir.
2002) (en banc) (explaining this aspect of Graver Tank).
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ultimately no one is able to claim that version of the invention,
regardless of its value.
Overall, given that applicants can easily protect themselves by
including an express description of the obvious variant, the gap
advances the interest in patent law by encouraging disclosure in the
patent document itself. The rule operates like an information-forcing
default penalty: an inventor who should possess a variant (because it is
obvious) can forfeit patent protection by failing to adequately disclose
that variant. Moreover, subsequent inventors cannot claim the variant
either. Such an information-forcing role facilitates public notice.
Additionally, resorting to sources extrinsic to the patent document
increases the cost of assessing patent scope and reduces certainty.
Finally, the risk of a highly commercially viable embodiment falling
into the gap is just that—a risk. Such a scenario would seem rather
unlikely, although not impossible. As such, ultimately the written
description gap appears to be a positive, if previously unappreciated,
aspect of the Federal Circuit’s written description jurisprudence.
CONCLUSION
This Essay has explored a previously unrecognized dynamic between
the written description requirement and obviousness. By holding that
obvious variants are insufficient to satisfy the written description
requirement, the Federal Circuit has created a gap in patent protection.
Those variants will fall into the public domain, free to be copied by
third parties. This gap in protection could be viewed favorably as
providing a zone of freedom for competitors to evaluate an invention,
and potentially to compete with the patent holder, free of the shadow of
patent liability. Moreover, the gap should incent patent applicants to be
more thorough in their initial disclosures to be sure they have disclosed
the obvious variants expressly. On the other hand, this gap in protection
could leave valuable and important innovations on the laboratory floor
if the lack of patent protection precludes commercialization of the
obvious variant. This dynamic could be particularly problematic if the
obvious variant is a superior version of the invention. The odds of this
happening, however, would seem to be rather slim. Ultimately, the
written description gap appears to implement a clear patent policy
objective: channeling more information into the patent document itself.
Nevertheless, this Essay demonstrates that such an objective is not
achieved without cost.

